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Not All MFA Is Equal: What MSPs Should Plan to Move To

3 hours ago
6 min read

Your techs have MFA. Great. But what kind?

That question matters more for an MSP than for most businesses. In our last post, Why Attackers Target MSPs, the first check was MFA on every account that can reach a client. This post is about the next question: is that MFA strong enough for the keys you hold?

You can watch the short version here:

The video uses a digital avatar of Erick Grau, CEO of Chibitek.

Why Does the Kind of MFA Matter?

CISA says any form of MFA is better than no MFA, and Microsoft says traditional MFA "significantly improves security over password-only systems." But in its fact sheet on phishing-resistant MFA, CISA also says "not all forms of MFA are equally secure." Some forms can be phished, flooded with push prompts, or intercepted through the phone network.

CISA says not all MFA is equally strong

CISA says not all MFA is equally strong. Source: CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA.

NIST says the same thing in its own terms. Its digital identity guidelines (SP 800-63B-4) state that one-time password (OTP) authentication and out-of-band authentication, the family that includes push approvals and text codes, are "not phishing-resistant."

For an MSP, this is not academic. The joint MSP advisory from CISA and its partner agencies says MSPs should implement MFA on all accounts that have access to customer environments and treat those accounts as privileged. If an attacker gets past a weak second factor on one of those accounts, they are not in one inbox. They may be in a client environment.

What Is Push Bombing?

Push bombing is a prompt flood

Push bombing: attackers keep sending requests until someone taps approve. Source: CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA.

Push prompts can be abused. CISA describes push bombing, also known as push fatigue, this way: attackers "bombard a user with push notifications until they press the 'Accept' button." The attacker already has the password. The flood of prompts does the rest, whether the user approves by accident, out of annoyance, or because they assume one of the prompts is real.

NIST calls the same pattern "authentication fatigue," where "a subscriber approves a fraudulent push-based authentication request to stop repeated requests." NIST's mitigation is to require the person to transfer a secret, such as a number, instead of simply tapping approve.

That is what number matching does. CISA's separate fact sheet on number matching says that if you use push-based MFA and cannot move to phishing-resistant MFA yet, you should turn on number matching, which makes the user type numbers from the sign-in screen into the app. CISA is clear that it is an interim step: "number matching is not as strong as phishing-resistant MFA."

Why Are Text and Voice Codes Weak?

Text and voice codes can be grabbed

Text and voice codes can be grabbed through weaknesses in the phone network. Source: CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA.

Text and voice codes can be grabbed through weaknesses in the phone network. CISA says attackers "exploit SS7 protocol vulnerabilities in communications infrastructure to obtain MFA codes sent via text message (SMS) or voice to a phone." It also lists SIM swap, where an attacker convinces a carrier to move the victim's phone number to a SIM the attacker controls.

In CISA's table of MFA forms ranked from strongest to weakest, SMS and voice sit at the bottom. CISA says that form "should only be used as a last resort," or as a temporary step while you move to something stronger. NIST also treats phone network delivery of codes as a restricted method and tells verifiers to watch for risk signs like a SIM change or number porting before using it.

What Is the Gold Standard?

The gold standard, per CISA, is phishing-resistant MFA. CISA's fact sheet says "phishing-resistant MFA is the gold standard and organizations should make migrating to it a high priority effort." It names two forms: FIDO/WebAuthn authentication and PKI-based MFA (such as smart cards). It calls FIDO/WebAuthn "the only widely available phishing-resistant authentication."

NIST backs this up independently: it names WebAuthn, used by authenticators that implement the FIDO2 specifications, as an example of a standard that provides phishing resistance by binding the sign-in to the real site's domain.

In practice, that usually means FIDO security keys or passkeys. Microsoft's Entra ID documentation describes passkeys (FIDO2) as "phishing-resistant credentials" built on FIDO standards, and recommends phishing-resistant methods such as Windows Hello for Business, passkeys (FIDO2) and FIDO2 security keys, or certificate-based authentication. Microsoft also notes that traditional MFA with SMS, email one-time codes, or authenticator apps is "prone to remote phishing attacks."

Where Should an MSP Start?

Start with admin accounts

Start with admin accounts. Chibitek guidance, consistent with treating client-facing accounts as privileged.

So for any account that can reach a client, plan the move to phishing-resistant MFA, starting with your admins.

That order is ours, and it lines up with CISA. The fact sheet says "CISA strongly urges system administrators and other high-value targets to implement or plan their migration to phishing-resistant MFA." For an MSP, that group is easy to find: anyone whose sign-in reaches a client tenant, an RMM, or an admin portal.

A practical way to plan it:

  1. List every account that can reach a client. Technician accounts, admin portals, remote tools, and shared logins all count. If you followed the checks in our last post, you already treat these as privileged.

  2. Note what MFA each one uses today. Push without number matching, text, and voice codes are the first to replace.

  3. Move your admins first, then the rest of your techs.

  4. Use the interim fixes while you move. CISA says app-based or token-based codes, or push with number matching, are the best options for small and mid-size businesses that cannot implement phishing-resistant MFA right away.

Key Points of Not All MFA Is Equal

  • CISA says not all forms of MFA are equally secure. Any MFA beats none, but some forms can be phished, flooded, or intercepted.

  • Push bombing floods a user with prompts until someone taps approve. Number matching helps, and CISA calls it an interim step.

  • Text and voice codes can be grabbed through weaknesses in the phone network. CISA ranks them last and calls them a last resort.

  • CISA calls phishing-resistant MFA, such as FIDO/WebAuthn, the gold standard. NIST and Microsoft agree that FIDO2/WebAuthn methods, including passkeys and security keys, resist phishing.

  • For any account that can reach a client, plan the move to phishing-resistant MFA, starting with your admins.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is push MFA still better than no MFA? Yes. CISA says any form of MFA is better than no MFA. The point is that push without number matching can be flooded, so plan to move past it, starting with accounts that reach clients.

Is number matching enough? CISA recommends it when you cannot implement phishing-resistant MFA yet, and says it is "not as strong as phishing-resistant MFA." Treat it as a bridge, not the destination.

Should my techs stop using text message codes? CISA says SMS and voice MFA should only be used as a last resort, or temporarily while you move to a stronger method. For accounts that can reach a client, plan to replace them.

What counts as phishing-resistant MFA? CISA lists FIDO/WebAuthn authentication and PKI-based MFA. Microsoft lists passkeys (FIDO2), FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, and certificate-based authentication among its phishing-resistant methods.

Who should move first? Your admins. CISA strongly urges system administrators and other high-value targets to implement or plan their move to phishing-resistant MFA.

Let's Compare Notes on MFA

At Chibitek, we are an MSP talking to MSPs. In our own shop, we use MFA, and Conditional Access policies decide when and how people can sign in. The question in this post is one we think every MSP owner should be able to answer about their own techs: what kind of MFA protects the accounts that reach your clients? If you want a second set of eyes on your plan, we are happy to compare notes. Contact us at hello@chibitek.com.

You can watch the short version here:

The same video is also on LinkedIn.

We make IT effortless so you can create, disrupt, and grow!

Follow Chibitek on YouTube at @chibitekmsp, and follow Chibitek on LinkedIn.

Sources

  1. CISA. "Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA" fact sheet, October 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf

  2. CISA. "Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications" fact sheet, October 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implement-number-matching-in-mfa-applications-508c.pdf

  3. NIST. SP 800-63B-4, "Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management" (final, July 2025). https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html

  4. CISA, NSA, FBI, NCSC-UK, ACSC, CCCS, NCSC-NZ. "Protecting Against Cyber Threats to Managed Service Providers and their Customers" (AA22-131A), last revised May 11, 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-131a

  5. Microsoft Learn. "Authentication methods in Microsoft Entra ID - passkeys (FIDO2)." https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passkeys-fido2

  6. Microsoft Learn. "What authentication and verification methods are available in Microsoft Entra ID?" https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods

  7. Chibitek. "Why Attackers Target MSPs: 3 Quick Checks for Your Own Shop." https://www.chibitek.com/msp-why-attackers-target-msps

  8. Chibitek. "Not All MFA Is Equal: What MSPs Should Plan to Move To" (YouTube Short). https://youtube.com/shorts/GSNgOfEnuZ4

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