Lock Down Your RMM: 3 Steps Every MSP Should Take
Your RMM tool can reach every client you have. So can anyone who takes it over.
This is the third post in our MSP Trust series. In Why Attackers Target MSPs, we talked about why one MSP can be a door into many client networks. In Not All MFA Is Equal, we looked at how strong the MFA on your techs' accounts really is. This post is about the tool that ties it all together: your remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform.
You can watch the short version here:
The video uses a digital avatar of Erick Grau, CEO of Chibitek.
Why Is the RMM Such a Big Target?
Think about what your RMM does all day. The NSA describes RMM software as a tool MSPs and help desks use for network management, endpoint monitoring, and remote interaction with hosts. That is exactly why we buy it. It is also exactly why an attacker wants it. One console, a path to every endpoint, and the trust of every client who installed your agent.
We have already seen what that looks like at scale. On July 2, 2021, a supply-chain ransomware attack hit multiple MSPs and their customers by abusing a vulnerability in Kaseya VSA, an RMM platform used by many MSPs. Canada's Cyber Centre described how the attackers injected malicious code into the product and then used its own native functions to deploy ransomware across MSPs to the organizations they managed. The MSP's own tool did the spreading.
What Did CISA and FBI Tell MSPs After Kaseya?
Within days of the attack, CISA and the FBI published guidance for affected MSPs and their customers. For MSPs, the list included downloading Kaseya's detection tool, turning on MFA for every account the organization controls (we covered why the kind of MFA matters in our last post), and two steps aimed squarely at the RMM itself. Those two steps are the first two in the Short.
A quick note on dates. CISA has since moved that 2021 alert into its archive, which it says may hold outdated information. The detection tool advice was specific to that incident. The two RMM controls below are not tied to one product or one week, which is why they are still worth doing today.
Step One: Put the RMM Admin Console Behind a VPN

Put the admin console behind a VPN, or on a dedicated admin network. Source: CISA and FBI, Kaseya VSA guidance.
CISA and FBI told affected MSPs to place the administrative interfaces of their RMM behind a virtual private network (VPN) or a firewall on a dedicated administrative network.
In plain terms: the login page for the console that controls every client should not be something anyone on the internet can reach and start guessing at. If your techs have to be on the VPN or the admin network before they can even see the login page, an attacker has to get through that layer first.
CISA's 2023 advisory on RMM abuse points the same way from another angle. It recommends that authorized RMM tools only be used from within your network over approved remote access, such as a VPN or a virtual desktop interface (VDI).
Step Two: Only Let the RMM Talk to Known IP Addresses

Only let it talk to known IP addresses. Source: CISA and FBI, Kaseya VSA guidance.
The second RMM step in the same guidance: use allowlisting to limit communication with RMM capabilities to known IP address pairs. In other words, decide in advance which addresses your RMM is allowed to talk to, and block everything else.
The guidance lists this step and the VPN step with "and/or" between them. Read that as a menu where doing both is better than doing one. Each closes a different gap. The VPN limits who can reach the console. The IP allowlist limits where the RMM traffic can go and come from.
Step Three: Allowlist Remote Tools and Block the Rest

Allowlist remote tools, block the rest, including portable versions. Source: CISA AA23-025A.
Locking down your own RMM is half the job. The other half is making sure nobody brings their own.
In January 2023, CISA, the NSA, and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) published a joint advisory, AA23-025A, on malicious use of legitimate RMM software. CISA described a campaign where emails led victims to download legitimate remote tools, ScreenConnect and AnyDesk, as portable executables that connected to the attackers' own servers. Portable versions run in the user's context with no install and no admin rights, so they can slip past controls that only watch for software installs. CISA also notes that the use of RMM software generally does not trigger antivirus or antimalware defenses. It is legitimate software, so your security tools may not flag it.
CISA's mitigations for this include:
Audit the remote access tools on your network to find which RMM software is in use and which is authorized.
Use application controls to manage which software can run, including allowlisting the RMM programs you approve. CISA says those controls should stop both installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized RMM software.
Block inbound and outbound connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the network perimeter.
For an MSP, this applies twice: in your own shop and in every client environment you manage. If your RMM is the only remote tool you approve, anything else that shows up is worth a question.
Key Points of Lock Down Your RMM
Your RMM can reach every client you manage, which makes it one of the most valuable things an attacker can take over.
After the July 2021 Kaseya VSA attack, CISA and FBI told affected MSPs to put RMM admin interfaces behind a VPN or a firewall on a dedicated admin network.
The same guidance said to allowlist RMM communication to known IP address pairs.
CISA's 2023 advisory AA23-025A adds the other side: know which remote tools are authorized, allowlist them, and block the rest, including portable versions.
CISA notes that RMM software use generally does not trigger antivirus, so you cannot count on your endpoint tools to catch a rogue remote tool for you.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this only apply to Kaseya customers? No. The 2021 guidance was written for MSPs affected by the Kaseya VSA attack, but the two RMM controls are general. CISA's 2023 advisory says threat actors can abuse any legitimate RMM software, not only the two tools seen in that campaign.
Do I need both the VPN and the IP allowlist? CISA and FBI listed them with "and/or." Either one shrinks your exposure. Together they cover both who can reach the console and where RMM traffic can flow.
Why doesn't antivirus catch a rogue remote tool? Because it is legitimate software. CISA says RMM software use generally does not trigger antivirus or antimalware defenses, which is why it recommends application controls and allowlisting instead.
What is a portable version of a remote tool? A copy that runs without being installed. CISA explains that portable executables launch in the user's context without admin rights, so they can run even where a control blocks the same tool from being installed.
Where should an MSP start? Start with an inventory. CISA's first RMM mitigation is to audit the remote access tools on your network and figure out which ones are actually authorized. You cannot block the rest until you know what the rest is.
Let's Compare Notes on RMM Security
At Chibitek, we are an MSP talking to MSPs. The RMM is the tool every one of us depends on, and it is also the one that would hurt the most in the wrong hands. Three questions worth answering about your own shop: can anyone on the internet reach your RMM login page, does your RMM only talk to addresses you expect, and do you know every remote tool running in your clients' environments? If you want a second set of eyes on your answers, we are happy to compare notes. Contact us at hello@chibitek.com.
You can watch the short version here:
The same video is also on LinkedIn.
Catch up on the series: Why Attackers Target MSPs and Not All MFA Is Equal.
We make IT effortless so you can create, disrupt, and grow!
Follow Chibitek on YouTube at @chibitekmsp, and follow Chibitek on LinkedIn.
Sources
BleepingComputer. "CISA, FBI share guidance for victims of Kaseya ransomware attack"
SecurityWeek. "US Government Agencies Warn of Malicious Use of Remote Management Software"
Chibitek. "Why Attackers Target MSPs: 3 Quick Checks for Your Own Shop"
Chibitek. "Not All MFA Is Equal: What MSPs Should Plan to Move To"
Chibitek. "Lock Down Your RMM: 3 Steps Every MSP Should Take" (YouTube Short)








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